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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
a plea Farfan-Galvan entered a conditional guilty 
plea to a single count of felony DUI (It was enhanced to a felony because of two prior 
misdemeanor DUI convictions.) Through his conditional plea, Mr. Farfan-Galvan 
preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the case 
entirely, or to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor, based on the fact that one of 
the prior misdemeanor DUI convictions was obtained in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
On appeal, Mr. Farfan contends the district court erred in denying his motion. He 
asserts the prior misdemeanor DUI conviction at issue was constitutionally infirm 
because he pied guilty and was sentenced without being appointed counsel or 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving of his right to counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On the night of November 2-3, 2014, Mr. Farfan-Galvan was involved in a single-
vehicle crash. (See R., pp.11-12.) After procuring medical treatment for Mr. Farfan-
Galvan, responding officers arrested him on suspicion of DUI. (See R., pp.11-13.) 
Breath tests yielded BAG results of 0.137 and 0.128. (R., pp.10, 13.) 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan was formally charged on November 3. (R, pp.6-7.) His DUI 
was charged as a felony based on the allegation that he had two prior misdemeanor 
DUI convictions in the preceding ten years. (R., p.7.) Specifically, the State alleged 
prior misdemeanor DUI convictions arising out of a 2008 Jerome County case (CR-
2008-2819) and a 2010 Twin Falls County case (CR-2010-10207). (R., p.7.) The 2010 
Twin Falls County conviction is at the heart of the appeal in this case. 
1 
After waiving his right to a preliminary hearing (see R., p.47) and being bound 
over to district court (see R., p.50), Mr. Farfan-Galvan filed a motion seeking outright 
dismissal of case or, in the alternative, reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor. 
(R., pp.54-58.) He argued that his 2010 misdemeanor DUI conviction could not be used 
to enhance his latest DU I to a felony because the 2010 conviction had been obtained 
through violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (R., pp.54-57; see a/so 
R., p.58 (written guilty plea form from 2010 case, which was submitted in support of 
motion); R. Ex. (transcript of sole hearing in 2010 case, which was prepared and lodged 
at Mr. Farfan-Galvan's request, and later considered with regard to the motion). 1) 
Specifically, he argued his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his motion 
for appointment of counsel in the 2010 case was denied and, thereafter, when he 
appeared without counsel, the magistrate court accepted his guilty plea and sentenced 
him without ever inquiring whether Mr. Farfan-Galvan wished to waive his right to 
counsel. 
The State filed a written objection to Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion. (See R., pp.68-
73.) In conjunction with that objection, the State submitted a host of documents related 
to the 2010 case, including Mr. Farfan-Galvan's public defender application (R., p.75), a 
letter from the magistrate court regarding Mr. Farfan-Galvan's public defender 
application (R., p.76), the same guilty plea form Mr. Farfan-Galvan had submitted in 
support of his motion (R., p.79), the court minutes from the lone hearing in that case 
(R., p.81), and a general "Notification of Rights Misdemeanor" form signed by 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan (R., p.87). 
1 The transcript of the October 5, 2010 hearing in the 2010 misdemeanor case appears 
as the sole exhibit to the Clerk's Record. It is identified herein with the prefix "R. Ex." 
2 
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion. (See generally 
4 that hearing, the d court heard arguments counsel; no 
evidence was offered. (See generally 12/3/14 Tr.) At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court took Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion under advisement. (12/3/14 
Tr., p.27, Ls.7-13.) The very next day though, the district court entered a written order 
denying Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion. (R., pp.90-96.) It found that, because the 
magistrate in the 2010 case had denied Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion for appointment of 
counsel "on the grounds that he [Mr. Farfan-Galvan] was not indigent," his rights under 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), were not violated. (R., p.95-96 & n.8.) 
Then, although it had recognized that State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003), requires 
that "a waiver of counsel ... be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently" (R., p.93), 
it concluded, based on its reading of State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89 (2004), that, 
"whether or not Galvan's right under Lovelace to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver of counsel was violated is immaterial" (R., p.96). 
Following the district court's denial of his motion, Mr. Farfan-Galvan entered into 
a plea agreement with the State. Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Farfan-Galvan 
would conditionally plead guilty to felony DUI, preserving his right to appeal the district 
court's order denying his motion to dismiss. (See R., pp.105-06, 113. 115-16; 12/22/14 
Tr., p.3, L. 18 - p.4, L.7.) In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a suspended 
2 The Reporter's Transcript consists of two separate electronic files containing 
transcripts. The file named "42868 Farfan Galvan Reporter's Transcript on Appeal VS" 
contains transcripts of the December 3, 2014 hearing on Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion to 
dismiss, as well as his December 29, 2014 sentencing hearing. The file named "Edgar 
Farfan-Galvan 12-22-14" contains only one transcript-the transcript of December 22, 
2014 change of plea hearing. 
3 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, with one of the conditions of probation 
90 days in , pp.105, 113; , p , 18 -
Pursuant to the terms the plea agreement, Mr. Farfan-Galvan entered a guilty 
plea (12/22/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-23, p.10, Ls.14-22), and the district court accepted that 
plea (12/22/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-19). A week later, a sentencing hearing was held.3 (See 
generally 12/29/14.) At the conclusion of that hearing, the district court imposed the 
sentence requested by both parties-five years, with two years fixed, suspended for a 
five-year period of probation, with one of the terms of probation being service of 90 days 
in county jail. (12/9/14 Tr., p.34, L.16 p. 35, L.3.) The district court entered a written 
judgment of conviction on December 29, 2014. (R., pp.119-27.) 
On January 6, 2015, Mr. Farfan-Galvan filed a notice of appeal which was timely 
from the judgment of conviction On appeal, he contends the district court erred in 
denying his motion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. 
3 Mr. Farfan-Galvan waived the pre-sentence investigation and asked to be sentenced 
as quickly as possible. (12/22/14 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.4, L.18.) This was done because 
everyone involved apparently assumed Mr. Farfan-Galvan would promptly be removed 
from the United States by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (See 12/22/14 
Tr., p.3, L.24 -p.4, L.3; 12/29/14 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.12, p.32, L.1 - p.33, L.2.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion to reduce his charge to a 
misdemeanor where one of the underlying misdemeanor convictions used to elevate his 
conviction in this case to a felony was obtained through violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Farfan-Galvan's Motion To Reduce The Charge 
To A Misdemeanor And Remand The Case To Magistrate Court 
Critical to disposition the felony appeal is the question of whether 
Farfan-Galvan's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated in the 2010 
misdemeanor DUI case. The Supreme Court has held that when, as here, the 
government seeks to enhance the punishment for a new offense by offering evidence of 
a prior conviction, the defendant may collaterally attack the prior conviction based on 
the violation of his right to counsel in that prior case. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 
114-16 (1967); see also Custiss v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (declining to 
extend Burgett to other collateral attacks on prior convictions) As the Court explained: 
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwrigh~4l to 
be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment 
for another offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since 
the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the 
accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth 
Amendment right. 
Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115 (citation omitted). 
Here, Mr. Farfan-Galvan's DUI charge was enhanced to a felony based on two 
prior misdemeanor convictions (one arising out of a 2008 case and one arising out of a 
2010 case) within the last ten years. However, because Mr. Farfan-Galvan was denied 
his right to counsel in the 2010 misdemeanor DUI case, under Burgett, the conviction in 
that case should not have been used to enhance the DUI charge in this case. 
Accordingly, the district court should have granted Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion, stricken 
the alleged enhancement, and reduced the charge to a misdemeanor. 
4 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
6 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan Had A Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel-At Least For 
Purposes Of Plea Entry And Sentencing-In The 2010 Misdemeanor DUI Case 
States Constitution guarantees that, "I all criminal prosecutions, 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI The Idaho Constitution contains a similar guarantee. IDAHO 
CONST. Art. I § 13. This right to counsel applies in all felony cases, and in those 
misdemeanor cases in which the defendant is ultimately deprived of his liberty. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 
U.S. 654 (2002). In any case in which the right to counsel applies, the defendant is 
entitled to the assistance of counsel during every "critical stage" of the criminal process. 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-27 (1967). It is well-established that entry of 
a guilty plea and sentencing are both critical stages where the defendant is 
constitutionally-entitled to counsel. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 US. 77, 81 (2004) (entry of 
plea); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967) (sentencing). 
In his 2010 misdemeanor DUI case. Mr. Farfan-Galvan suffered a loss of liberty, 
i.e., incarceration. (See R., p.81; R. Ex., p.4, Ls.3-4, 14-24.) Thus, even though that 
case was a misdemeanor case, Mr. Farfan-Galvan was generally entitled to a lawyer. 
Further, because the lone hearing held in that case was a joint change of 
plea/sentencing hearing (see R. Ex., p.2, Ls.7-10), it was a critical stage at which 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan was constitutionally-entitled to the assistance of counsel. 
B. Mr. Farfan-Galvan Had A Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel At State Expense 
In The 2010 Misdemeanor DUI Case 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant with 
the right to counsel is entitled to an attorney at government expense if he cannot afford 
to hire one: 
7 
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to 
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
haled into court, who is too poor a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair 
trial unless counsel is provided This seems to us to be an obvious 
truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast 
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. 
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the 
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants 
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can 
get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in 
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with 
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair 
trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our 
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on 
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials 
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before 
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A 
defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving 
words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with 
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may 
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence. 
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). 
In the 2010 misdemeanor DUI case, Mr. Farfan-Galvan filled out an application 
for a public defender, thereby providing a partial glimpse of his need for appointed 
counsel. (See R., p.75.) In his application, Mr. Farfan-Galvan indicated he and his 
8 
three-year old son shared a home with girlfriend, and together, and his girlfriend 
month magistrate 
(R., p.76.)5 Mr. Farfan-Galva contends this was error. 
First, this Court should presume that the denial of Farfan-Galvan's motion for 
appointment of counsel was error. In Burgett, supra, where the record was unclear as 
to whether the defendant had been represented by counsel in his prior case, the 
Supreme Court presumed that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated in that 
case. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114. Likewise, here, where the record is silent as to why 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion for appointment of counsel was denied in the 2010 case, 
this Court should presume that it was denied improperly and in violation of Mr. Farfan-
Galvan's Sixth Amendment rights. 
Alternatively, if this Court were to review the application for appointment of 
counsel de novo,6 it would have to conclude that Mr. Farfan-Galvan was entitled to 
5 In this case, the State claimed "Mr. Farfan-Galvin [sic] was specifically found by Judge 
Kershaw to have adequate discretionary income with which to hire an attorney." 
(R., p.72.) However, that claim was false. In fact, the record reveals only "that the 
Judge denied [his] application for a Public Defender"; no reason was given. (R., p.76.) 
The record is completely silent was to whether the application was denied based on a 
finding that Mr. Farfan-Galvan was not indigent, the magistrate incorrectly believed 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan's case was one where the Sixth Amendment did not apply (see 
National Legal Aid & Defender Association, The Guarantee of Counsel-Advocacy & 
Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts, p.46 (Jan. 2010) ("NLADA Report") (noting a 
practice by Idaho magistrates of refusing to appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases 
where they do not initially intend to impose a jail sentence, and failing to explain to 
defendants why their requests for appointed counsel have been denied)), or for some 
other reason. 
Unfortunately, the district court adopted the State's misstatement of fact, 
asserting Mr. Farfan-Galvan's application "was denied on the grounds that he was not 
indigent," and going on to claim that the magistrate "concluded that based on his 
income, he was not indigent." (R., p.95 & n.8; accord R., p.9 ("[T]his court finds that ... 
Galvin [sic] applied for a public defender, was turned down based on income .... ").) 
Because this finding is not supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record, 
it was clearly erroneous. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506 (2003). 
9 
appointed counsel.7 Although Mr. Farfan-Galvan listed his "household income" as 
that includes his girlfriend's 
is irrelevant, as she was under no obligation to pay Mr. Farfan-Galvan's legal fees. 
More likely, the relevant amount was Mr. Farfan-Galvan's portion of the income listed-
about $1 ,400/month if Mr. Farfan-Galvan and his girlfriend were making comparable 
wages. $1,400/month equates to only $16.800/year. And since Mr. Farfan-Galvan was 
financially responsible not only for himself, but also for his three-year old son (R., p.75),8 
this annual income barely put him above the poverty threshold. 9 Finally, since the 
6 Without knowing the reason(s) for the magistrate's denial of the motion in the 2010 
misdemeanor case (see note 5, supra), this Court cannot review the denial for an abuse 
of discretion. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (identifying the three-part 
standard for determining whether a lower court abused its discretion, certain prongs of 
which require an evaluation of the lower court's reasoning). 
In 2010, Idaho had no meaningful standard for determining indigency. Idaho law 
provided only that "the court concerned may consider such factors as income, property 
owned, outstanding obligations, and the number and ages of his dependents." I.C. § 
19-854 (2010). As a result, 
Idaho courts lack[ed] any uniformity in (a) the type of information collected 
from the defendant requesting counsel and (b) the manner in which the 
magistrate judges c[a)me to determine eligibility. . . . The ability of a 
person to have [his) constitutionally-mandated right to counsel met [was] 
entirely dependent on which side of a county line the crime [was] alleged 
to have been committed, and sometimes dependent further upon which 
judge within a given [was] presiding on the day one [same] to court. 
(NLADA Report, p.50.) Thankfully, section 19-854 has since been amended, and it now 
provides more meaningful guidance to the judiciary. See I.C. § 19-854. 
8 There is no indication that Mr. Farfan-Galvan's girlfriend, Janet Ceballos, was the 
mother of Mr. Farfan-Galvan's son or otherwise financially responsible for him. (See 
R., p.75.) 
9 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the poverty threshold for a household of two, 
including a child, in 2010 was $14,602. (Available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/poverty/data/threshld/index.html.) Because of the high cost of attorneys, some 
states have adopted a presumption that anyone whose income is less than two times 
(200%) the poverty threshold is eligible for the appointment of counsel. (NLADA 
Report, p.49.) Idaho law currently presumes that anyone making less than 187% of the 
poverty threshold qualifies for a public defender. I.C. § 19-854(2)(a). Under this 
standard (which would provided a cutoff of $27,306), Mr. Farfan-Galvan easily would 
have qualified for the appointment of counsel. 
10 
public defender application Mr. Farfan-Galvan submitted contained no space to indicate 
Mr. had any savings, there is no information as to whether he 
the cash on hand pay an attorney's retainer requirement Under these 
circumstances, it is readily apparent that Mr. Farfan-Galvan could not have afforded the 
high cost of a private attorney. Accordingly, the magistrate erred in denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel. 
C. Even If Mr. Farfan-Galvan Was Not Entitled To The Appointment Of Counsel At 
State Expense, His Sixth Amendment Rights Were Nonetheless Violated 
Because He Appeared Pro Se Without Having Waived The Right To Retained 
Counsel 
Even if this Court determines Mr. Farfan-Galvan was not entitled to the 
appointment of counsel at state expense, there can be no doubt that Mr. Farfan-Galvan 
retained a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel at his own expense. As 
noted above, he retained this right at every "critical stage" of his case, including entry of 
plea and sentencing. 
Certainly, Mr. Farfan-Galvan was free to waive his right to counsel and represent 
himself. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806 (1975); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967). However, the Supreme 
Court has held that any such waiver must have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81, 88; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). And such a 
waiver cannot be presumed; rather, every presumption must be made against a waiver 
of the right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Johnson, 304 
U.S. at 464; see also Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-15 ("Presuming waiver of counsel from a 
silent record is impermissible."). Here, there was no waiver-much less a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver. 
11 
Below is a timeline events in 2010 misdemeanor DUI case demonstrating 
was even though never waived right 
• Mr. Farfan-Galvan was arrested for DUI on September 5, 2010. (See 
R., pp.54, 70, 94.)10 
• On September 7, Mr. Farfan-Galvan bonded out of jaiL (See R., pp.54, 
94.)11 
• September 9, 2010 was the date set for Mr. Farfan-Galvan's arraignment; 
however, it does not appear he ever went before a judge that day. 12 (See 
Register of Actions; see also R., p. 70 (State's recitation of the events of 
September 9, 2010, omitting any reference to Mr. Farfan-Galvan being in court), 
p.94 (district court referencing Mr. Farfan-Galvan appearing "at the courthouse 
counter on 09/09/1 O").) Most likely, Mr. Farfan-Galvan spoke only to the 
prosecutor and, perhaps, a deputy clerk. 13 
10 Below, both parties made this representation of fact (R., pp.54, 70) and the district 
court accepted it as true (R., p.94). While there is no evidence in the record to support 
the district court's finding, it is consistent with the register of actions for Twin Falls 
County Case No. CR-2010-10207 ("Register of Actions"). (See http://icourt.idaho.gov/.) 
11 Again, there is no evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion on 
this point; however it is consistent with the Register of Actions. 
12 "In some Idaho misdemeanor courts, the only advice of rights that a defendant will 
receive is a written form which they will be handed by the clerk of the court. . . . Some 
courts ... rely heavily on a videotape recital of the defendant's constitutional rights." 
(NLADA Report, pp.45-46.) 
13 The NLADA Report discussed the fact that "[t]he focus of misdemeanor courts in 
Idaho seems designed to yield speedy dispositions by getting as many defendants as 
possible to plead guilty at their arraignments and without having to provide counsel to 
those who are indigent. (NLADA Report, p.47.) As that Report pointed out, 
misdemeanor arraignments often are not staffed by public defenders, but are staffed by 
prosecutors looking to obtain guilty pleas from unrepresented defendants. Id. 
12 
It appears that on September 9, 2010, ML Farfan-Galvan signed 14 and 
s a guilty plea. 'p. appears been 
partially completed (the caption and questions five and six, which inquire into the 
charge and the maximum sentence) by someone other than Mr. Farfan-Galvan, 
as the handwriting is noticeably different (See R . p.79.) Presumably, the guilty 
plea form was filled out by an agent of the prosecution. 
• Also on September 9, 2010, Mr. Farfan-Galvan signed a form notifying 
him of the potential penalties for future DUI offenses (R., pp.77-78) and a second 
form notifying him of his rights with regard to the DUI case then at hand 
(R, p.87.) The latter form referenced Mr. Farfan-Galvan's right to counsel, 
stating as follows: "You have the right to be represented by an attorney at all 
times. If you want an attorney, but cannot afford to pay for one, the court will, in 
appropriate cases, appoint one to help you." (R., p.87 (emphasis added).) It is 
not clear whether Mr. Farfan-Galvan received these notifications before or after 
signing the guilty plea form. 16 
14 The State claims the guilty plea form was filled out on September 9, 2010 (R., p.70), 
and the district court accepted this assertion as true. (R., p.94.) While this makes a 
certain amount of sense, given that September 9, 2010 was the date of Mr. Farfan-
Galvan's arraignment, and it was the date on which Mr. Farfan-Galvan submitted the 
completed form to the court clerk, it is notable that Mr. Farfan-Galvan appears to have 
dated the form September 7, 2010 (the same date he bonded out of jail). 
15 Under I.M.C.R. 14(b)(1), submitting a written guilty plea form was not effective as 
entry of a guilty plea. The Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules provided that a 
defendant could not plead guilty to DUI by submitting a written plea. Compare I.M.C.R. 
14(b)(1) (2010) (providing that a written plea could not be entered for a motor vehicle 
offense where the bail bond amount exceeds $256) with I.M.C.R. 13(b) (2010) 
(providing that the minimum bail bond for a second DUI offense was $1,000). See also 
State v. Hernandez, 2014 WL 172278, *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2014) (unpublished) 
("Rule 14 does not allow for a clerk to accept a plea to a misdemeanor."). 
16 The NLADA Report noted that in some of Idaho's misdemeanor courts, defendants 
are not informed of their rights "until after the defendants gathered in the courtroom 
have been told to talk to the prosecutor about working out a guilty plea and sentencing 
13 
On September 14, 201 Mr. Farfan-Galvan filed an application for 
of Falls Defender. (R., 
The next day, someone "Erica" magistrate sent 
Mr. Farfan-Galvan a letter informing him that the court had denied his application 
for appointment of the public defender. (R., p.76.) It did not explain why counsel 
had been denied. (See R., p.76.) 
• On October 5, 2010, Mr. Farfan-Galvan appeared before Magistrate 
Judge Kershaw without counsel. Judge Kershaw confirmed that Mr. Farfan-
Galvan did not have a lawyer, but failed to inquire whether Mr. Farfan-Galvan 
understood that he still had a right to counsel since his motion for appointed 
counsel had been denied, or whether he wished to waive his right to counsel. 
(R. Ex., p.2, Ls.7-10.) Instead, the court simply proceeded with the hearing. 
Judge Kershaw accepted Mr. Farfan-Galvan's previously-submitted guilty plea 
and imposed a sentence. (R., p.81; see generally R. Ex.) 
What the foregoing demonstrates is that Mr. Farfan-Galvan never actually waived 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (much less did so knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily). He appeared for an arraignment on September 9, 2010, during which time 
he appears to have spoken only to the prosecutor and/or a deputy clerk, and 
immediately decided to plead guilty. Thus, when Mr. Farfan-Galvan initially decided to 
plead guilty, he did so without the benefit of the advice of counsel or, perhaps, even the 
agreement, leaving the clear impression that a defendant should first meet alone and 
uncounseled with the lawyer for the state and then, and only then, ask for appointment 
of a defense attorney if they do not reach a plea agreement with the prosecutor." 
(NLADA Report, p.46.) 
14 
knowledge that he had a right to counsel Further, this initial decision may well have 
in to pressures upon the prosecutor. 
Nearly a week later, after having been apprised his right to counsel (through 
the written notice provided at the arraignment) and having had time to consider his 
options, Mr. Farfan-Galvan moved for the appointment of counsel at State expense. 
This action not only evidence a desire for free counsel; it evidenced a desire for counsel 
generally. It was an affirmative invocation of the right to counsel, and it was a timely 
invocation. As noted above, submission of the written guilty plea form was inadequate 
to effectuate entry of a guilty plea, see I M.C.R. 14(b)(1), so Mr. Farfan-Galvan was in a 
position to walk back his prior decision to plead guilty had counsel recommended it. 
Finally, although Mr. Farfan-Galvan appeared pro se for entry of his guilty plea 
and imposition of his sentence after the motion for appointment of counsel was denied, 
merely appearing and acquiescing to the court's proceeding with the case did not 
constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. First, Mr. Farfan-Galvan was required to 
appear, regardless of whether he had (or wanted) the assistance of counsel. Second, 
silence is not indicative of a waiver. "[T]he right to counsel does not depend on a 
request by the defendant." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S 387, 404 (1977). Indeed, as 
noted above, courts indulge every presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, 
not vice versa. Id. This is particularly important where Mr. Farfan-Galvan had already 
requested counsel (R., p.75), but had his request denied without explanation (R., p.76). 
Under these circumstances, Mr. Farfan-Galvan might not have known that he could still 
15 
up and request an opportunity hire counsel 17 and he certainly was not 
Although not controlling with to whether Mr. Farfan-Galvan knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Idaho Code 
section 19-857, which provides the standard for waiver of the statutory right to counsel, 
is nonetheless instructive. It provides as follows: 
A person who has been appropriately informed of his right to counsel may 
waive any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of 
or after waiver, finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his 
rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise 
according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's 
age, education, and familiarity with the English language and the 
complexity of the crime involved. 
I.C. § 19-857.18 Under this standard, it cannot be said that Mr. Farfan-Galvan 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. First, he was not 
appropriately informed of his rights. While he received a notification of rights form on 
September 9, 2010, as discussed above, once his motion for appointment of counsel 
was denied, Mr. Farfan-Galvan should have been informed that he still had a right to 
retain counsel Second, there was no actual waiver, only silence and acquiescence. 
Third, even if there had been an actual waiver, Judge Kershaw did not inquire whether, 
much less find on the record that, Mr. Farfan-Galvan was aware of the rights he was 
relinquishing or the consequences attendant thereto. Finally, since the Judge Kershaw 
17 It is important to remember that the notification of rights form signed by Mr. Farfan-
Galvan indicated there were two prerequisites for the appointment of counsel: (1) the 
inability to pay for private counsel and (2) the existence of an "appropriate case[ ]." 
(R., p.87.) Since the latter requirement was not explained, it would have led the 
reasonable defendant to believe that there are cases in which the assistance of counsel 
is inappropriate. 
18 Section 19-857 has not been substantively changed since 2010. Compare I.C. § 19-
857 (2010). 
16 
not engage in any inquiry make any ings, he clearly did not consider Mr. Farfa 
Under of the 20 0 case, while Judge Kershaw was under no 
obligation to provide Mr. Farfan-Galvan a complete Faretta-type warning 19 regarding 
any of the specific dangers associated with self-representation, see Tover, 541 U.S. at 
91-93, he did have an obligation to see if Mr. Farfan-Galvan wished to represent himself 
and then ensure that any such waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary. Because Judge Kershaw utterly failed to do so, Mr. Farfan-Galvan's 
conviction in the 2010 misdemeanor DUI case was unlawful and cannot properly be 
used to enhance the penalty in the present case. See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-16. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in this case by failing to strike the enhancement and 
reduce the charge to a misdemeanor. 
19 In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant wishing to exercise his right to self-representation "should be made aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation .... " 
17 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Farfan-Galvan respectfully requests that th is 
Court: (1) hold that the 2010 misdemeanor conviction was obtained in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, therefore, cannot be used to enhance any 
subsequent offenses; (2) vacate Mr. Farfan-Galvan's conviction and sentence; (3) 
reverse the district court's order on ML Farfan-Galvan's motion to dismiss or remand; 
and (4) remand this case to the district court with an order that ML Farfan-Galvan be 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, and that the felony enhancement be stricken and the 
DUI charge reduced to a misdemeanor. 
DATED this 11 th day of September, 2015. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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